Universität zu Köln
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät

Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar - Prof. Schmitz

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Prof. Dr. Patrick W. Schmitz [back]

Publications in international journals

• Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study (with Petra Nieken)
  Experimental Economics, forthcoming.
• Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory
  Economics Letters, Vol. 226, 2023, 111103.
• The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts
  European Economic Review, Vol. 157, 2023, 104511.
• Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?
  Economics Letters, Vol. 224, 2023, 111012.
• How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts
  Economic Journal, Vol. 132 (647), 2022, 2563–2577.
• Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information
  Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 198, 2021, 104424.
• On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries
  Economics Letters, Vol. 202, 2021, 109823.
• The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract (with Daniel Müller)
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 184, 2021, 653-669.
• How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects (with Eva I. Hoppe)
  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 123 (1), 2021, 238-266.
• Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 182, 2021, 100-112.
• Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
  Economics Letters, Vol. 186, 2020, 108514.
• Public Goods, Property Rights, and Investment Incentives: An Experimental Investigation (with David J. Kusterer)
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 177, 2020, 514-532.
• Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership
  Economics Letters, Vol. 183, 2019, 108558.
• Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments (with Susanne Goldlücke)
  European Economic Review, Vol. 110, 2018, 211-222.
• Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory (with Eva I. Hoppe)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 109, 2018, 544-564.
• Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 144, 2017, 153-165.
• Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
  Economics Letters, Vol. 159, 2017, 96-99.
• The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence (with David J. Kusterer)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 104, 2017, 706-725.
• Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs (with Daniel Müller)
  Economics Letters, Vol. 152, 2017, 88-92.
• Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm (with Daniel Müller)
  European Economic Review, Vol. 87, 2016, 92–107.
• The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information
  Economics Letters, Vol. 145, 2016, 33–37.
• Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: The Role of Bargaining Frictions
  Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 132, 2015, 23–31.
• Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory (with Eva I. Hoppe)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 89, 2015, 17-33.
• Overdeterrence of Repeat Offenders when Penalties for First-Time Offenders are Restricted (with Daniel Müller)
  Economics Letters, Vol. 129, 2015, 116–120.
• Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (with Jörg Oechssler and Andreas Roider)
  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 171 (4), 2015, 565-588.
• Investments as Signals of Outside Options (with Susanne Goldlücke)
  Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 150, 2014, 683–708.
• Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered
  Economics Letters, Vol. 125 (1), 2014, 21–24.
• Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study (with Eva I. Hoppe)
  Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 80 (4), 2013, 1516-1544.
• Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered
  Economics Letters, Vol. 121 (3), 2013, 533-536.
• Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering (with Eva I. Hoppe)
  RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 44 (1), 2013, 56-74.
• Investments in Physical Capital, Relationship-Specificity, and the Property Rights Approach
  Economics Letters, Vol. 119 (3), 2013, 336-339.
• Job Design with Conflicting Tasks Reconsidered
  European Economic Review, Vol. 57, 2013, 108–117.
• Bargaining Position, Bargaining Power, and the Property Rights Approach
  Economics Letters, Vol. 119 (1), 2013, 28–31.
• Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: An Experimental Investigation (with Eva I. Hoppe and David J. Kusterer)
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 89, 2013, 145-166.
• Incomplete Contracts and Optimal Ownership of Public Goods
  Economics Letters, Vol. 118 (1), 2013, 94-96.
• Repeated Moral Hazard and Contracts with Memory: A Laboratory Experiment (with Petra Nieken)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 75 (2), 2012, 1000–1008.
• Repeated Moral Hazard and Contracts with Memory: The Case of Risk-Neutrality (with Susanne Ohlendorf)
  International Economic Review, Vol. 53 (2), 2012, 433-452.
• The Hold-up Problem, Innovations, and Limited Liability
  Economics Letters, Vol. 117 (3), 2012, 841–843.
• The (Sub-)Optimality of the Majority Rule (with Thomas Tröger)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 74 (2), 2012, 651-665.
• Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices (with Andreas Roider)
  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 114 (3), 2012, 808–830.
• Public Goods and the Hold-up Problem under Asymmetric Information
  Economics Letters, Vol. 117 (3), 2012, 642–645.
• Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence (with Eva I. Hoppe)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 73 (1), 2011, 186-199.
• Contractual Solutions to Hold-up Problems with Quality Uncertainty and Unobservable Investments
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 46 (5), 2010, 807-816.
• Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks (with Eva I. Hoppe)
  Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94 (3-4), 2010, 258-268.
• The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures (with Eva I. Hoppe)
  Economics Letters, Vol. 107 (1), 2010, 58-62.
• Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases (with Jörg Oechssler and Andreas Roider)
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 72 (1), 2009, 147-152.
• Participation Costs for Responders can Reduce Rejection Rates in Ultimatum Bargaining (with Philipp C. Wichardt and Daniel Schunk)
  Economics Letters, Vol. 103 (1), 2009, 33-35.
• Information Gathering and the Hold-up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework
  Economics Letters, Vol. 101 (3), 2008, 268-271.
• Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard (with Tymofiy Mylovanov)
  Economic Theory, Vol. 37 (2), 2008, 307-320.
• Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem under Asymmetric Information
  Economics Letters, Vol. 99 (3), 2008, 577-580.
• Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem, and Asymmetric Information
  Economics Letters, Vol. 99 (1), 2008, 119-122.
• Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points (with Stephanie Rosenkranz)
  Economic Journal, Vol. 117 (520), 2007, 637-653.
• Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information
  European Economic Review, Vol. 51 (4), 2007, 859-870.
• Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? (with Stephanie Rosenkranz)
  Economica, Vol. 74 (296), 2007, 573-585.
• Exclusive versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard
  Economics Letters, Vol. 97 (3), 2007, 208-214.
• Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach
  American Economic Review, Vol. 96 (1), 2006, 422-434.
• Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
  RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 36 (2), 2005, 318-336.
• Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?
  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 21 (2), 2005, 315-329.
• Endogenous Punishments in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information (with Anke S. Kessler and Christoph Lülfesmann)
  International Economic Review, Vol. 46 (4), 2005, 1207-1231.
• Workplace Surveillance, Privacy Protection, and Efficiency Wages
  Labour Economics, Vol. 12 (6), 2005, 727-738.
• Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems under Asymmetric Information
  European Economic Review, Vol. 48 (5), 2004, 1027-1046.
• Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments (with Stephanie Rosenkranz)
  Schmalenbach Business Review/Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Vol. 56 (1), 2004, 72-89.
• On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition
  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 39 (8), 2003, 901-909.
• Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances (with Stephanie Rosenkranz)
  Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 43 (1), 2003, 153-173.
• On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information
  Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 106 (1), 2002, 177-189.
• Simple Contracts, Renegotiation under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-up Problem
  European Economic Review, Vol. 46 (1), 2002, 169-188.
• On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
  Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 103 (2), 2002, 444-460.
• On Synergies and Vertical Integration (with Dirk Sliwka)
  International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 19 (8), 2001, 1281-1295.
• The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory
  Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 53 (1), 2001, 1-17.
• The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of not Assigning Property Rights
  European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 11 (1), 2001, 23-28.
• Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered
  FinanzArchiv, Vol. 57 (4), 2000, 394-411.
• Yes Men, Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts (with Christian Ewerhart)
  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 43 (1), 2000, 115-125.
• On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation
  International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 20 (3), 2000, 371-382.
• Know-how Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts (with Stephanie Rosenkranz)
  Economics Letters, Vol. 63 (2), 1999, 181-185.
• Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment (with Christian Ewerhart)
  American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (4), 1998, 1027.
• Randomization in Coalition Contracts
  Public Choice, Vol. 94 (3-4), 1998, 341-353.
• Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information
  Public Finance, Vol. 52 (1), 1997, 89-101.

Book reviews

• "Contract Theory (by P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont)"
  Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162 (3), 2006, 535-540.
• "Property Rights - Cooperation, Conflict, and Law (ed. by T.L. Anderson and F.S. McChesney)"
  Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, Vol. 81 (1), 2004, 87-92.
• "Bargaining Theory with Applications (by A. Muthoo)" (with Stephanie Rosenkranz)
  Public Choice, Vol. 113 (3), 2002, 491-495.
• "On Voting (by G. Tullock)"
  Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 11 (4), 2000, 381-383.
• "Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts (by S. Renner)"
  Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, Vol. 71 (3), 2000, 336-338.

German publications

• "Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström" (mit Daniel Müller)
  WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, Bd. 45 (12), 2016, 657-660.
• "Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information"
  WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, Bd. 32 (4), 2003, 239-242.
• "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen" (mit S. Rosenkranz)
  in: Jost, P.J. (Hrsg.), Die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie in der BWL , Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, Stuttgart, 2001, 241-271.
• "Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung"
  WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, Bd. 29 (6), 2000, 328-330.
• "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern" (mit D. Sliwka)
  Homo Oeconomicus, Bd. XV (2), 1998, 233-243.
• "Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma" (mit C. Ewerhart)
  WISU - Das Wirtschaftsstudium, Bd. 27 (8-9), 1998, 880-882.
• "Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?"
  Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften/Review of Economics, Bd. 48 (3), 1997, 351-360.
• "Der Lock-in-Effekt und das Hold-up-Problem" (mit C. Ewerhart)
  WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, Bd. 26 (7), 1997, 360-363.
• "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge" (mit C. Ewerhart)
  Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften/Review of Economics, Bd. 48 (1), 1997, 57-69.
• "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge" (mit C. Ewerhart)
  Homo Oeconomicus, Bd. XIII (4), 1996, 501-514.

Monographs

• "Essays on the Economic Theory of Contracts and Incentives"
  Habilitationsschrift, Univ. Bonn, 2004.
• Investment Incentives under Asymmetric Information and Incomplete Contracts
  Shaker, Aachen, 1999.

Recent working papers

• When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods?, mimeo.